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The natural consequence of development of Information Society is that investigat-
ors should be able to collect evidence in digital environment. Access to data stored  
on personal computers enables collection of important information about suspects -  
for example their plans, habits and contacts. Using hacking tools investigators can  
detect bank account numbers or secret pin codes. The development of Internet tech-
nologies made it possible to do it secretly, without people knowing that they are be-
ing watched. Furthermore, the methods typically used to commit crimes on the Net  
such as: Trojan software, keyloggers or sniffers can be also used by investigators  
and police to protect citizens and to fight terror effectively.
Are  traditional  legal  measures,  typical  for  off-line  police  operational 
activities such as surveillance, bugging telephones, searching homes or re-
questing data from third parties, sufficient for on-line investigation? Or is it 
necessary to adopt a special legal regime to deal with this situation? Anoth-
er important question is how to seek a delicate balance between effective 
crime-fighting law and one which respect constitutional rights? New invest-
igation methods that are based on hacking tools can easily violate citizens’ 
rights such as the right to privacy, information self-determination or home 
inviolability.
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Development of information society services has moved a large part of our 
life activity from the real world to the virtual one. New Internet tools are 
applied not only in shopping or banking transactions, but they also “effect-
ively” support criminals in stealing, swindling, or blackmailing. In numer-
ous cases conventional crimes committed off-line are also prepared via the 
Internet. That is why the development of information society services poses 
new challenges for legal protection bodies. It becomes necessary to gather 
all evidence in the virtual world, and, what is very important, protect and 
evaluate it. Gathering of evidence may not be, however, limited to confisca-
tion of hardware. The majority of digital traces is to be found on encrypted 
disks or external servers. Therefore, in order to conduct efficient operational 
activities in the digital environment, it is necessary to use more advanced 
information  technology  tools,  in  particular  such  software  which  secretly 
traces activity of criminals and suspects without their knowledge. Those in-
struments will include in particular software of “spyware” type. Neverthe-
less, application of such tools, in a degree greater than with traditional oper-
ational methods used in the real world, touches sensitive aspects, to include 
the right to privacy, freedom and protection of communication, as well as 
the right to inviolability of domestic peace, all guaranteed, among others, in 
art. 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.
At the same time however, the feeling of threat caused by terrorist at-
tacks and an increase in the level of organised crime results in the society 
having higher and higher expectations towards the State within the area of 
public security. They are accompanied by widespread consent to the State 
entering the sphere of fundamental rights guaranteed to every individual, 
on condition that this is intended to serve accomplishment of the goal, i.e. 
guaranteeing the protection of citizens’ safety. Take the following example - 
in the real world we agree to omnipresent cameras installed in public places 
which record us in lifts, supermarkets, or at streets. Although this means of 
protection breaches our privacy, and – many’s the time – even our dignity, 
we accept it  allowing for the goal for accomplishment of which they are 
used – fighting terrorism and organised crime.  In the virtual world such 
consent to activities conducted by state authorities, resulting from the ne-
cessity to guarantee the public security, is also high.
In Poland plans of the government to extend the obligation of data reten-
tion up five years have not aroused any social controversies. What is inter-
esting,  the argument supporting the extension of the period required for 
data retention was the necessity to secure the evidence. This resulted, indir-
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ectly, from the serious problem of the Polish judicial system seen as lengthi-
ness of proceedings, not from the necessity to fight terrorism and organised 
crime, which both constitute a threat to security of the State. Those plans 
have been criticised mainly by telecommunication operators,  who would 
have to directly bear the costs of such solution,  and by experts in Com-
munity law. The latter emphasised incompliance of the Polish draft act with 
the requirement of Article  12 of Directive 2006/24/EC  on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services. The Directive provides for ex-
tension of the maximum two-year period of data retention on condition that 
a given Member State facing „particular circumstances” states the grounds 
for introducing such measures and they will be approved by the European 
Commission. 
New information technologies go hand in hand with the development of 
tools which may be effectively used by law enforcement bodies in their op-
erational activities, and they may support the protection of public order and 
public security. One of examples may be software enabling remote penetra-
tion of computers, such as Trojan horses, sniffers, or keyloggers. A Trojan horse, 
also known just as  Trojan, is a name of  malware which, while acting as a 
useful  or  interesting  application,  it  in  fact  activates  an  undesirable  and 
hidden functionality  (e.g.  spyware or logic bombs).  A  sniffer is  computer 
software designed to intercept and, possibly,  analyse data flowing across 
the network. A common feature of many such analysers is switching the 
network card into a promiscuous mode, in which the device captures all 
frames from the network, including the ones not addressed directly to it. In 
addition, sniffers may be activated also on a router or a computer which is 
one of the parties in the communication. The sniffer may also be applied for 
monitoring of network activity of third parties. Another type of computer 
software used for stealing passwords is a keylogger. These programmes take 
over the control of procedures of the operating system responsible for oper-
ation of the keyboard. Each keystroke is recorded in a special file. Option-
ally,  information  on  keys  being  struck  is  supplemented  with  additional 
data, such as the name of the active application or window. Keyloggers con-
tain functions which protect them from being discovered by an inexperi-
enced computer user, and the file in which the data is recorded is hidden, 
e.g. among system folders. That is why, if undetected, they can “reside” on 
a victim computer and cause disclosure of all passwords used. The majority 
of  keyloggers  have also a specially developed function which enables send-
ing of a file with passwords to a defined e-mail address. Hardware keylog-
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gers are usually small adapters to be connected to the port of the computer 
keyboard. The keyboard is then connected to the adapter which records all 
struck keys in the built-in memory or sends the information via radio. In the 
case of keyloggers of the first type, physical access to the device is necessary 
in order to read the data. There are also hardware keylogges built in the key-
board or the cable connecting the keyboard with the computer.
The effectiveness of such hacking tools are confirmed by American ex-
periences with application of the CIPAV (Computer and Internet Protocol 
Address Verifier) software. CIPAV is Windows software deployed by the 
FBI via e-mail or the Instant Messaging communicator. The software is in-
stalled on the target computer or on a MySpace or Google Mail  account 
from  which  it  infects  the  target  computer.  Upon  installation,  CIPAV 
searches the entire hard disk and sends to the FBI recorded information on 
running programmes, the browser being used, the type of operating system 
(along with its serial number),  as well as other data concerning the user. 
Facts disclosed by the FBI related to the use of CIPAV prove high effective-
ness of the spyware. In 2007 FBI used it during an investigation to identify a 
person who had repeated bomb threats by e-mail against Timberland High 
School  from 4th to  7th June  2007.  After  on  12th June  2007 FBI  had  been 
granted a court approval to use CIPAV,1 the perpetrator was arrested on 
14th June 2007.  Pursuant  to the court  warrant,  the software was only al-
lowed to be used for collection of such data as IP address, Media Access 
Control address for the network card, list of open TCP and UDP ports, the 
list of running programs, type of operating system and its version and serial 
number  (in  Windows,  the  serial  number  is  the  25-digit  alphanumeric 
product activation key), default browser and its version, default language of 
the operating system, currently logged-in user (username), registered com-
pany name (the latter is optional in Windows.), the last visited URL. The 
court warrant expressly limited the possibility to control contents of the sus-
pect’s correspondence. Although one may have well-grounded doubts as to 
whether the FBI restricted themselves to the control of transmission data 
only and they did not read through the correspondence and the data recor-
ded on the suspect’s computer, or whether the spyware had not been de-
ployed  earlier  in  order  to  identify  the  perpetrator,  the  effectiveness  of 
CIPAV seems unquestionable allowing for the fact that there was only a 
ten-day lapse between the first bomb threat and the actual apprehension of 
the perpetrator. None of the traditional investigation methods, even analys-
1 Court search warrant from 12th of June 2007, United States District Court, Western District 
of Washington, case Nb. 07-MJ-05114-APPL
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is of the transmission data taken from the Internet Service Provider would 
ever result in the perpetrator being captured so swiftly. 
Nevertheless, considering the potential scope of their applications, new 
investigation tools being used in the European legal environment raise nu-
merous doubts. Their usage poses the need to answer crucial questions re-
lated with the protection of fundamental rights of individuals, e.g. whether 
traditional legal protection measures typical of police operational activities 
in the real world, such as surveillance, bugging telephones, searching or re-
questing  information  from  third  parties  are  sufficient  for  investigation 
methods in the digital environment, or is it necessary to introduce special 
legal  regime controlling  such activities?  We must  also identify  a way to 
achieve  a  balance  between effective  criminal  law and such  criminal  law 
which respect constitutional norms.
In Germany there has been a very interesting discussion continuing in 
this respect. At the request of the federal authorities special spyware was 
prepared to conduct remote search of computer hardware. As the German 
authorities  argued,  such  information  technology tools  are  frequently  the 
only way to access data stored by criminals on computer disks. It is often 
the case that on confiscation the data has already been permanently deleted 
and disks – formatted. Moreover, due to potential problems with infecting 
computers,  it  was demanded that in further phases appropriate software 
should be installed in computers at the production stage. In the future this 
would make it easier to infect computers by spyware used by investigation 
bodies.  Initially,  under  German  law,  Strafprozessordnung  [the  German 
code of criminal proceedings, hereafter referred to as “StPO”) norms were 
set up to legitimise application of techniques of remote computer penetra-
tion.  That,  however,  did not  meet  with  approval  of  the German Federal 
Tribunal (hereafter referred to as “BGH”). In its judgement of 31 January 
2007 on StB 18/06,2 the Tribunal stated that remote searches on-line were not 
covered by the provisions of §102 StPO related with searches performed at 
the suspect’s  in connection with §110 sec.  3 StPO on searching electronic 
data carriers.
Pursuant  to   §102 StPO  it  is  allowed  to  search  an  apartment,  other 
premises or property of a person suspected of being, among others, a per-
petrator, co-perpetrator, beneficiary, participant or leader of the crime, if it 
is  supposed that such search may result in obtaining evidence.  Based on 
§110 sec. 3 StPO it is permitted to search electronic data carriers, as well as 
2 http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?
Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2007&Sort=3&nr=38779&linked=bes&Blank=1&file=doku-
ment.pdf
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seizing thereof, if it  is suspected that otherwise the data may be lost. Ac-
cording to the interpretation of BGH, these norms do not apply to secret on-
line searches. Regulations of the German code of criminal proceedings, per-
taining to searches, base on fundamental pre-proceedings guarantees which 
cannot be fulfilled in the case of remote penetrations of computers. In the 
first place it is the guarantee of openness of actions undertaken by officers. 
During a search, the owner of the premises has the right to be present, and – 
in the event of their absence – their representative or an adult member of 
their family. Outside persons should also be present (§§105 and 106 StPO). 
Moreover, at the request of the interested party, after the undertaken activit-
ies have been completed, a written record of the performed activities should 
be made, based on which it is possible for the investigation bodies to exam-
ine legality of those actions, and, in particular whether they are stipulated 
by applicable  law.  Moreover,  as  BGH pointed out,  under  the  applicable 
StPO  regulations,  the  examining  judge  might  not  order  a  secret  search 
which would exclude the protection guarantees stipulated by §§105 and 106 
StPO. The Tribunal also stated that secret on-line searches could not be gov-
erned by the regulations of §100a and the subsequent StPO related to the 
monitoring of telecommunication. These regulations provide for this meas-
ure being ordered only upon suspicion of committing particularly serious 
crimes. That is why application of such searches is subject to highly restrict-
ive and tight formal requirements. In addition, the very disposition of this 
rule  diverges  from the  aim of secret  on-line  searches.  Disposition  of the 
norm stipulated in §100a of StPO refers to the control of communication 
between the suspect and a third person, whereas the goal of the ordered 
search of a computer serves achievement of other results. Hence, the Ger-
man Federal Tribunal’s judgement leads us directly to a finding that the ap-
plicable regulations of the German criminal procedure have not created any 
legal framework for new investigation instruments, based on such spyware 
as, for instance, a Trojan horse.
The judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Tribunal [Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, hereafter referred to as “BVG”] of 27 February 2008 on 1 
BvR 370/073 and 1 BvR 595/07 also constitutes interesting contribution to the 
public  debate  in  Germany  concerning  the  legal  framework  of  remote 
searches. The Tribunal examined compliance of the regulations governing 
on-line searches applicable in the Land of NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA (Nordrhein-
Westfalen) with the constitutional patterns contained in the German Consti-
tution Act [Grundgesetz, hereafter referred to as “GG”]. In particular exam-
3 http://134.96.83.81/entscheidungen/rs20080227_1bvr037007.html
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ination of BVG related to the norms in art. 2 § 1 GG [protection of personal-
ity development], art. 1 § 1GG [protection of human rights] as well as art. 10 
GG [secrecy of correspondence] and  art. 13 GG [home inviolability]. 
Pursuant to art. 2 § 1 GG every individual has the right to unhindered 
personality  development,  as  long  as  it  does  not  infringe  rights  of  third 
parties,  and if it  is not in contradiction with the constitutional  order and 
moral rights. According to art. 1 § 1 GG, human dignity is inviolable, and 
the state authorities are obliged to respect and protect it. The regulation in 
art. 10 GG refers to secrecy of correspondence. According to its disposition, 
secrecy of correspondence, as well as secrecy of letters and parcels, or com-
munications, is also inviolable. Limitations in this respect must result from 
statutory regulations. If such limitations serve the protection of free, demo-
cratic constitutional regime or existence or protection of the Republic or a 
state, the Act may stipulate that they shall be applied without the interested 
party’s knowledge, and that instead of legal course consequent control shall 
be implemented and conducted by democratically  established authorities 
and auxiliary organs. Pursuant to art. 13 GG, inviolability of apartment is 
guaranteed. In particular, searches may be ordered by a judge, and in cases 
of the utmost urgency, also by organs prescribed by statutory law. Searches 
must be conducted in a form dedicated to achievement of that goal. If par-
ticular facts ground an assumption that a crime has been committed, which 
is  stipulated by the Act as particularly serious,  it  is  allowed, based on a 
judge’s instruction, and in order to pursue the perpetrator, to reach for tech-
nical means of acoustic monitoring of an apartment which is believed to be 
the suspect’s  current  whereabouts,  provided that examination of a given 
case  otherwise  would  be  disproportionally  hindered  or  objectless.  Such 
measures must be limited in time. The order must be issued by the panel 
composed of three professional judges. In the most urgent cases it is enough 
if such an order is issued by one professional judge. To repel a direct and in-
evitable danger to public security, in particular public danger or danger to 
life, it is allowed to use technical means to monitor premises only based on 
a  court  order.  In  cases  of  the  utmost  urgency,  such  measures  must  be 
ordered also by other organs prescribed by statutory law. In such an event 
they must be confirmed by a court warrant issued forthwith. In the remain-
ing cases intervention and limitations may be applied only to repel public 
danger or danger to life, as well as based on regulations of the act, for pro-
tection against a sudden threat to security and public order. The aforemen-
tioned provisions of the German Constitution, in particular art. 13. clearly 
stipulate that a measure in a form of home search may be deployed only on 
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an exceptional basis, and it is hedged with tight procedural requirements 
intended to protect citizens against unfounded interference in their funda-
mental entitlements subject to legal protection, such as the right to privacy, 
dignity and inviolability of secrecy of correspondence or domestic peace.
In its judgement, BVG decided in particular that the constitutional guar-
antees of art. 2 § 1 in relation with art. 1 part. 1 GG, with respect to personal 
rights include also confidentiality of correspondence and integrity of telein-
formation systems.  Secret  infiltration  of the information system which is 
used to monitor the system and which enables searching through contents 
of data carriers is, under the Constitution, acceptable only if there is actual 
evidence supporting the existence of specific threat to an essentially import-
ant entitlement subject to legal protection. As essentially important entitle-
ment subject to legal protection are deemed corporeal inviolability, human 
life  and freedom or general  values,  the existence  of  which  relates to the 
grounds of existence  of  the state or  its  citizens.  These  measures  may be 
deemed legally founded if there is a justified probability that the threat or 
danger will emerge in the near future, or if certain facts indicate a threat to 
an essentially important entitlement subject to legal protection, that might 
be posed by specific individuals. Secret infiltration of teleinformation sys-
tem must be, in principle, conducted on the basis of a court order. The act 
which  allows  application  of  such  measure  must  additionally  include  ar-
rangements to protect the essence of private life. That is why legal admis-
sion of application of remote searches requires, as assumed by BVG, amend-
ments to articles 10 GG and 1  GG. 
The German Federal Constitutional Tribunal made a reference indirectly 
to the principle of proportionality and adequacy. It recognised that applica-
tion of investigation measures which interfere in privacy so drastically, such 
as remote search of computers, may be performed only when this appears 
to be the only method which may effectively eliminate threats to essentially 
important entitlements subject to legal protection. Therefore, searches on-
line must constitute an exceptional measure justified by reasons of supreme 
significance. With reference to the proportionality and adequacy principle, I 
believe that it is worth discussing the argumentation presented by the Ger-
man government to a question presented during the parliamentary question 
time with regard to remote searches.4 The government’s reply clearly indic-
ated that in the period of two years (2005–2006) examining judges issued 
only four decisions ordering remote searches of computers. Simultaneously, 
the government did not see any possibility to assess the number of such 
4 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/039/1603973.pdf 
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searches in the future, but was able to present costs of infrastructure invest-
ments  reaching EUR 200 000.  What  is  really important,  and what  in  my 
opinion, puts under a question mark the need for introduction of so radical 
measures, is the fact directly confirmed by the German government - that 
out of the four described cases of ordering remote searches of computers, 
none had been ordered due to the necessity to directly repel a threat.
The  consequence  of  BGH’s  judgement  dated  31  January  2007  on  StB 
18/06,5 as well as of BVG’s dated 27 February 2008 on 1 BvR 370/07 was the 
commencement of legislative works with a view to establish special legisla-
tion for the purpose of remote searches. Due to the lack of political con-
sensus, it is difficult to predict in what form new legal regulations will come 
into force. It appears that the new German law will allow usage of remote 
searches  of  suspects’  computers.  Each time,  application  of  such  measure 
will have to be accepted by an independent judge. Moreover, also the man-
ner of using data obtained as a result of such search will have to be each 
time specified in a court decision. That requirement is intended to protect 
privacy of citizens against arbitrariness of law enforcement bodies.  Addi-
tionally, the entitlement to apply for court approval for usage of spyware in 
order to perform a remote search will be limited to cases in which there are 
suspicions of terrorism.6
It is also likely that under the Polish constitutional norms, in particular 
art. 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland which guarantees the 
legal protection of private life to every individual, as well as art. 49 relating 
to the freedom and protection of secrecy of communication,  the situation 
might be settled analogously as in German law. These guarantees will  be 
strengthened by the regulation in art. 51 § 2 of the Polish Constitution, un-
der which public authorities may not acquire, gather or make available in-
formation of the citizens other than such as is necessary in a democratic rule 
of law. Additionally, in its decision dated 26 April 2007 on case I KZP 6/077,  
the subject of which was, among others, interpretation regulation art. 19 of 
the act on police, related with police operational activities, including bug-
ging telephones also the Polish Supreme Court, and the Criminal Chamber 
composed of  seven judges,  directly stated that  the norm unquestionably 
entered the sphere of constitutional civil rights and liberties,  in particular 
the protection of private life, freedom of communication and the right of 
protection of home inviolability. This statement proves that ordering applic-
5 http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=
pm&Datum=2007&Sort=3&nr=38779&linked=bes&Blank=1&file=dokument.pdf
6 Analysis as at December 2008 after rejection by Bundesrad a draft act on Bundeskrimin-
alamt. 
7 http://www.sn.pl/orzecznictwo/uzasadnienia/ik/I-KZP-0006_07.pdf
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ation of operational activities which interfere in privacy, such as bugging 
telephones or provocations, may be applied on an exceptional basis, only if 
there is a suspicion of committing the most serious crimes by specific per-
sons, enumerated in art. 19 § 1 of the act on police. Therefore, in my view, 
also under Polish law, law enforcement bodies could not use modern opera-
tional techniques based on technologies such as “sniffer”, “Trojan horse”, or 
“keylogger”, without special relevant legislation, and perhaps even with no 
appropriate amendments to the Polish Constitution related with the protec-
tion of privacy,  secrecy of  communications  and inviolability  of  domestic 
peace. 
That is why, I have come to a conclusion that nowadays, when a large 
part of our life activity has been moving to the virtual world, it is necessary 
to develop tools supporting bodies of legal protection in the Internet envir-
onment. Such instruments may not, however, be used without deep reflec-
tion and wide debate over their technological potential, as well as threats 
which they may bring for the basic human and civil rights. I believe that in-
creased awareness  in  this  respect  and an open discussion may lead to a 
compromise between criminal law effective in the online environment and 
criminal law respecting all constitutional norms, as well as to definition of 
rational legal framework needed modern technology used to protect secur-
ity of citizens.
